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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court o f A p p e a l s has j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r 
t h i s appea l pursuant t o Rule 4A(a) of the Rules o f the 
Utah Court of Appea l s : 
At any time before a case is set for oral argument 
before the supreme court/ that court may transfer 
to the Court of Appeals any case except those 
cases within the Supreme Court's exclusive 
jurisdiction. Such order of transfer shall be 
issued without opinion, written, or oral, as to 
the merits of the appeal or the reason for the 
transfer. 
This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court 
to the Utah Court Appeals on June 15, 1988. Jurisdiction 
is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Utah Code 1987-1988). 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
. . . over: . . . cases transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants/Appellants made a motion, under Rule 
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Utah Code 57-1-32. 
Said Motion was denied by the Honorable David E. Roth in 
the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
Plaintiffs/Respondents made a Motion for Summary 
Judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Said Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
and judgment was entered against Defendants/Appellants by 
the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County/ State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether Utah Code 57-1-32 (Utah 1987-1988) provides 
the exclusive procedure for securing a deficiency 
judgment by a second lien holder following a trustee's 
sale when the sale was conducted by a first lien holder. 
2. Whether the three (3) month limitation period set 
forth in Utah Code 57-1-32 (Utah Code 1987-1988) applies 
to a junior lienor following a trustee's sale of property 
by a senior lienor. 
3. Whether Summary Judgment was appropriate because 
the Plaintiffs increased the burden of risk to Defendants 
when the Plaintiffs subordinated their interest in real 
property to a third party lending institution without the 
knowledge or permission of the Defendants. 
4. Whether Summary Judgment was appropriate when there 
are questions of fact concerning the intent of the 
parties and the underlying purposes of a trust deed note 
signed by the parties. 
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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code 57-1-32 (1987-1988) • 
At any time within three months a f ter any sa le of 
property under a t r u s t d e e d / a s h e r e i n a b o v e 
provided/ an a c t i o n may be commenced to recover 
the balance due upon the ob l iga t ion for which the 
t r u s t deed was g i v e n as s e c u r i t y / and in such 
act ion the complaint sha l l s e t for th the e n t i r e 
amount of the indebtedness which was secured by 
such t r u s t d e e d / t h e amount for which such 
p r o p e r t y was s o l d / and the f a i r market va lue 
thereof at the date of s a l e . Before render ing 
judgment the court s h a l l f ind the f a i r market 
value at the date of sa l e of the property so ld* 
The court may not render judgment for more than 
the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with i n t e r e s t / c o s t s / and the expenses of s a l e / 
including t r u s t e e ' s and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s / exceeds 
the f a i r market value of the property as of the 
date of the sale* In any a c t i o n brought under 
t h i s s e c t i o n the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s s h a l l be 
e n t i t l e d to c o l l e c t i t s c o s t and r e a s o n a b l e 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s incurred in br ing ing an act ion 
under t h i s s e c t i o n , 
Utah Code 78-37-1 (1987-1988) . 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured 
solely by mortgage upon real estate which action 
must be in accordance with provisions of this 
chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the 
amount xlue, ^ with jcosts and disbursements,
 tand the sale of mortgagee! property or some part tnereor, 
to satisfy said amount and accruing costs/ and 
directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution/ and a special execution or 
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from two separate Orders in the 
Second Judicial District Court/ Weber County/ State of 
Utah. In the first Order/ the court denied 
Defendants/Appellants motion to dismiss Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents Complaint made pursuant to Utah Code 57-1-32. 
In the second Order the lower court granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiffs sought to recover on obligation 
secured by a second trust deed following the sale of real 
property at a trustee sale conducted by the holder of a 
first trust deed. No trial was held on the matter. 
Defendants appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The case 
was then transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 4, 1984/ the Defendants/ David L. DurbanO/ 
Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen, (hereinafter referred 
to collectively as "Defendants" or "Mr. Sachter")/ signed 
as g u a r a n t o r s a t r u s t d e e d n o t e . ( R . 
112/113/118/121/124). See Addendum A for a copy of the 
trust deed note. 
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2. The trust deed note was to be paid in one (1) 
payment on or before January 1/ 1985. (R. 5). 
3* The trust deed note has the names of Steven F. 
Cundick and Marlene H. Cundick typed below signature 
lines/ but no other names are typed below signature 
lines. (R. 5). 
4. The trust deed note was secured by a deed of trust 
with power of sale, dated May 4, 1984. (R. 2 Plaintiff's 
Complaint paragraph No. 8; R. 6; R. 54; R. 130; R. 140/ 
141). See Addendum B for a copy of the trust deed. The 
Defendants at all tiroes thought the trust deed which 
secured the trust deed note was in a first priority 
position. (R. 113). 
5. The Plaintiffs/ without knowledge of Defendants/ 
subordinated Plaintiffs security interest/ i.e. the trust 
deed/ to Citizens Bank. (R. 141; See affidavit of G.A. 
Adams; R. 118/ 121/ 124/ affidavit of David Durbano/ Paul 
Sachter/ Richard Mortensen). 
6. On March 17/ 1987/ the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation/ which held a first lien on the property/ 
sold the property at a public trustee sale. The proceeds 
from the sale were allegedly insufficient to cover the 
obligation held by the Plaintiffs under the trust deed 
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n o t e and which was s e c u r e d by the t r u s t deed g i v e n t o 
P l a i n t i f f s . (R. 48) . 
7 . On August 19/ 1987/ P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a Complaint in 
the Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court of Weber County/ S t a t e 
of Utah/ seek ing t o r e c o v e r on an o b l i g a t i o n secured by a 
t r u s t deed* (R. 1 ) . P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint a l l e g e s t h a t a 
p u b l i c t r u s t e e ' s s a l e was h e l d / t h a t the proceeds from 
t h e t r u s t e e s s a l e w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c o v e r t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n s c r e a t e d by t h e t r u s t deed n o t e / and t h a t 
Defendants were indebted t o P l a i n t i f f s i n an amount o f 
$ 3 8 / 6 0 4 . 5 4 p l u s i n t e r e s t in the amount of $ 1 3 / 7 5 1 . 3 1 from 
May 4/ 1984 through J u l y 31/ 1987 . (R. 2 / 3 ) . 
8 . On O c t o b e r 5/ 1987/ Defendants f i l e d a Motion t o 
D i s m i s s P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint under Utah Rules of C i v i l 
Procedure Rule 12(b) pursuant t o Utah Code 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 (1987-
1 9 8 8 ) . (R. 2 4 ) . On October 30/ 1987/ P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a 
R e s p o n s e t o D e f e n d a n t ' s Mot ion t o D i s m i s s P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Complaint . (R. 3 3 ) . On November 2 5 / 1 9 8 7 / D e f e n d a n t s 
f i l e d a r e p l y t o P l a i n t i f f s R e s p o n s e t o D e f e n d a n t s ' 
Mot ion t o D i s m i s s . (R. 8 4 ) . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on 
D e f e n d a n t s ' Motion t o D i s m i s s on December 1 4 / 1 9 8 7 / 
b e f o r e the Honorable David E. Roth. (R. 88) . By minute 
e n t r y / d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 4 / 1 9 8 7 / Judge Roth d e n i e d 
D e f e n d a n t s ' Motion t o D i s m i s s . (R. 9 7 ) . The Order 
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d e n y i n g D e f e n d a n t s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s was e n t e r e d 
December 23 , 1987 . (R. 1 0 5 ) . 
9 . On D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 7 , D e f e n d a n t s a n s w e r e d 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 Complaint (R. 1 0 6 ) , s p e c i f i c a l l y a d m i t t i n g 
and denying the a l l e g a t i o n s in P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint, and 
Defendants s e t f o r t h a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s and l e g a l and 
f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t r a d i c t i n g m a t e r i a l f a c t s 
c o n t a i n e d in P l a i n t i f f s ' C o m p l a i n t . (R. 1 0 6 - 1 1 1 ) . In 
t h e i r answer, Defendants den ied t h e y r e c e i v e d any v a l u e 
i n e x c h a n g e f o r s i g n i n g t h e t r u s t deed n o t e . ( S e e 
D e f e n d a n t s ' Answer p a r a g r a p h 4 , R. 1 0 7 ) . D e f e n d a n t s 
denied any knowledge t h a t the t r u s t deed s igned by them 
on May 4 , 1984 was a second t r u s t d e e d . (See Defendants ' 
Answer No. 5 , R. 1 0 7 ) . Defendants den ied they owed the 
amount c l a i m e d by P l a i n t i f f s . (See Defendants ' Answer 
p a r a g r a p h 9 , R. 1 0 8 ) . F u r t h e r , D e f e n d a n t s a l l e g e d 
a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s t h a t P l a i n t i f f s c r e a t e d t h e i r own 
r i s k of l o s s and tha t Defendants were merely guarantors 
of the t r u s t deed n o t e . (R. 1 0 9 ) . 
1 0 . On November 1 3 , 1987 , P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 8 0 ) , accompanied by a Memorandum of 
P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s i n S u p p o r t o f i t s Motion f o r 
Summary Judgment. (R. 5 3 ) . In P l a i n t i f f s ' Memorandum in 
S u p p o r t , P l a i n t i f f s m e r e l y r e i t e r a t e d t h e a v e r m e n t s 
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contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint as "undisputed 
material facts." (R. 53-54) • Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by the affidavit of C.A. 
Ferriri/ Jr. Mr. Ferrin's affidavit also merely 
reiterated the averments contained in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. (R. 59-60). 
11. On December 23/ 1987/ Defendants filed a response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 112). 
Defendants' response specifically put into dispute the 
facts that the Defendants signed the trust deed note as 
makers/ that Defendants had received any value for 
signing the trust deed note/ that Defendants were unaware 
of the subordination of the trust deed to Citizens Bank/ 
that the value of the property sold at the trust deed 
sale should have been more than sufficient to cover the 
obligations secured by the trust deed property/ and that 
Plaintiffs caused the risk of loss by their own failure 
to bid at the trustee sale. (R. 112-114). Defendants' 
response and the disputed facts are supported by 
affidavit of all three Defendants. (R. 118,121/124). 
12. On January 12/ 1988/ Plaintiffs filed a reply to 
Defendants response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 128). Additional facts were presented by 
Plaintiffs' claiming Plaintiffs agreed that the property 
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c o u l d be s o l d t o S t e v e n and Marlene Cundick (R. 1 2 9 ) . 
P l a i n t i f f s admitted they subord ina ted t h e i r t r u s t deed t o 
the t r u s t deed of C i t i z e n s Bank. ( C i t i z e n s Bank f a i l e d 
and was taken over by the FDIC). (R. 1 3 0 ) . The property 
was s o l d a t the t r u s t e e s a l e for $ 4 0 / 5 2 1 . 5 0 . (R. 1 3 1 ) . 
The D e f e n d a n t s 1 o b l i g a t i o n s t o P l a i n t i f f s o r i g i n a l l y 
arose under a Uniform Real E s t a t e Contract dated December 
14/ 1 9 7 9 . (R. 1 4 2 ) . To Defendants knowledge sa id Uniform 
Real E s t a t e Contract was in a p r i o r i t y p o s i t i o n over any 
o t h e r c r e d i t o r s . (R. 1 1 8 / 1 2 1 / 1 2 4 ) . 
1 3 . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on P l a i n t i f f s 1 Motion f o r 
Summary Judgment on J a n u a r y 2 9 / 1 9 8 8 . (R. 1 6 3 ) . The 
l o w e r c o u r t ' s m i n u t e e n t r y on P l a i n t i f f s 1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment i s dated J a n u a r y 2 9 / 1 9 8 8 . (R. 1 6 5 ) . 
J u d g e R o n a l d 0 . H y d e / a f t e r h e a r i n g argument from 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 and Defendants ' c o u n s e l r u l e d : 
I f the matter i s a l l one (1) t r a n s a c t i o n then the 
c o u r t w i l l g r a n t j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . I f t h e r e i s another t r u s t deed p u t t i n g 
t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n f i r s t p o s i t i o n / d e f e n d a n t s 
c o u n s e l t o p r o d u c e t h e d e e d t o t h e c o u r t / 
de fendants counse l t o have 10 days t o do s o . I f 
t h e r e i s no d e e d / t h e n p l a i n t i f f s c o u n s e l t o 
prepare and submit t h e judgment f o r t h e C o u r t s 
approval and s i g n a t u r e . (R. 1 6 5 ) . 
1 4 . On F e b r u a r y 1 0 / 1 9 8 8 / D e f e n d a n t s f i l e d a 
Supplemental A f f i d a v i t t o augment o r a l argument r e s i s t i n g 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1 7 2 ) . The 
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A f f i d a v i t r e a f f i r m s t h e D e f e n d a n t s ' p o s i t i o n and s e t s 
f o r t h f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e l o w e r 
c o u r t . (R. 1 7 2 - 1 7 9 ) . 
1 5 . On February 17, 1988 , P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a Motion t o 
S t r i k e the February 10 , 1980 a f f i d a v i t of De fendants . (R. 
2 0 6 ) . On March 28 , 1988 , Defendants f i l e d a re sponse t o 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 Motion t o S t r i k e (R. 2 7 9 ) , and a Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants 1 Response . (R. 2 7 5 ) . 
1 6 . On F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 8 8 , P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion f o r 
Summary Judgment was g r a n t e d by Judge Ronald 0 . Hyde. 
(R. 2 3 3 ) . In the Order, the Court mere ly s t a t e s t h e r e 
are no genuine i s s u e s of f a c t and P l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d 
t o judgment a s a m a t t e r o f l a w . (R. 2 3 3 ) . The lower 
c o u r t awarded P l a i n t i f f s j u d g m e n t i n t h e amount o f 
$ 3 8 , 6 0 4 . 5 9 p lus $ 1 5 , 7 7 4 . 3 9 i n t e r e s t from May 4 , 1984 t o 
January 29 , 1988 for a t o t a l o f $ 5 4 , 3 7 9 . 5 2 p l u s i n t e r e s t , 
p l u s $ 6 , 2 9 3 . 5 0 a t t o r n e y s f e e s . (R. 2 3 4 ) . 
1 7 . On May 6 , 1 9 8 8 , P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d an O r d e r 
(uns igned) tha t Defendants A f f i d a v i t dated February 1 0 , 
1988 be s t r i c k e n from the r e c o r d . (R. 3 2 5 ) . On Apri l 15 , 
1988 Defendants f i l e d an o b j e c t i o n to P l a i n t i f f s proposed 
Order. (R. 3 0 6 ) . 
1 8 . On May 9 , 1988, the lower court made a r u l i n g on 
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Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike/ granting the Motion but no 
Order has been signed. (R. 341). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Legislature has written statutes to govern 
the recovery of obligations secured by trust deeds and 
mortgages. One statute/ Utah Code 57-1-32/ governs the 
recovery of obligations secured by trust deeds. The 
other statute/ Utah Code 78-37-1/ governs the recovery of 
obligations secured by mortgages. The Utah Supreme Court 
has created two specific lines of case law interpreting 
each of the above statutes. The different lines of case 
law provide for remedies under each statute. The line of 
case law that interprets Utah Code 57-1-32 sets forth the 
rule of law that creditors holding obligations secured by 
trust deeds may seek to recover balances due on such 
obligations only if an action to recover is commenced 
within three (3) months following an election of the 
trust deed power of sale granted in Utah Code 57-1-32. 
The Plaintiffs/ in the case at bar/ brought an 
action to recover the balance due on an obligation 
secured by a second trust deed following the exercise of 
the trustee power of sale by the holder of an obligation 
secured by a first trust deed/ but did not do so within 
the three month limit of the statute. Accordingly/ the 
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three month limitation for bringing an action to recover 
on the balance due, as set forth in Utah Code 57-1-32 and 
as interpreted by dispositive Utah Supreme Court case 
law, bars Plaintiffs1 Complaint. This court should 
reverse the decision of the lower court which denied 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss and dismiss Plaintiffs1 
Complaint with prejudice. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the 
facts/ viewed in a light most favorable to the resisting 
party, show with certainty that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In the case at bar, there 
are genuine issues of fact and the Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The record clearly indicates there are material 
disputes between the parties concerning whether or not 
Mr. Sachter is a maker or a guarantor of a trust deed 
note, whether or not the Plaintiffs caused the loss of 
the security by their own acts or omissions/ whether or 
not the Plaintiffs increased the burden of risk to Mr. 
Sachter by subordinating their security interest to a 
third party lending institution without Mr. Sachter's 
knowledge, and finally/ what the amount/ if any# was owed 
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by Mr. Sachter to Plaintiffs. 
This case involves written documents/ the intent 
and underlying purposes of which are in dispute. Utah 
law prohibits the granting of summary judgment when the 
case involves written documents and the intent of the 
parties and the underlying purposes are in dispute. The 
lower court granted summary judgment inspite of the 
disputed contentions regarding the intent of the parties 
to a trust deed note and trust deed/ and the question 
regarding the underlying purposes of the trust deed note 
was raised in the record. 
Because the positions of the parties are mutually 
contradictory and the submissions of the parties do not 
establish for a certainty that Plaintiff is entitled to 
prevail/ the lower court erred in granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This court should reverse 
and remand the case to the lower court for adjudication 
on the merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS P l a i n t i f f s ' COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
5 7 - 1 - 3 2 (1987-1988FT 
In the case a t b a r , P l a i n t i f f s are benef ic ia r ies 
under a t r u s t deed and note owed by Defendant Steve and 
Marlene Cundick (Cundicks) which the Defendant/Appellants 
Durbano/ S a c h t e r and Mor tensen g u a r a n t e e d . The 
Defendant/Appellants Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen are 
here inaf ter co l l ec t ive ly re fe r red to as "Mr. Sach t e r " . 
Mr. Sachter made a Motion to the t r i a l court under Rule 
12(b) of t h e Utah Ru les of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , t h a t 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 Complaint be dismissed. Mr. Sachter ' s Motion 
to Dismiss was made upon the premise that P l a i n t i f f s ' 
Complaint was not fi led within the three month time l imi t 
as r equ i r ed by Utah Code 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 . (R-24) The t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s fa i lu re to grant Mr. Sach te r ' s Motion to Dismiss 
i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and t h i s cour t should gran t Mr. 
Sach te r ' s Motion to Dismiss. 
Utah Code 57-1-32 (1987-1988) s t a t e s in per t inent 
par t as follows: 
At any time wi th in t h r e e months a f t e r any 
s a l e of p roper ty under a t r u s t d e e d , as 
h e r e i n a b o v e p r o v i d e d , an a c t i o n may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
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obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security . . . 1 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in two separate 
decisions that Utah Code 57-1-32 provides the exclusive 
procedure for securing a deficiency judgment following a 
trustee's sale of real property under a trust deed. The 
exclusive procedure of the statute requires that "within 
three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed . . . an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed 
was given as security . . ." (emphasis added). Utah 
Code 57-1-32 (1987-1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Utah Code 
57-1-32 in the case of Cox v. Green/ 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1985). In the Cox case the Utah Supreme Court was faced 
with a fact pattern much like the case at bar. The facts 
of Cox are as follows: Plaintiffs' sold real property to 
the Defendants. Defendants agreed to pay a first trust 
deed lien on the property in favor of a third party 
lending institution. Defendants further executed a 
promissory note, secured by a second deed of trust for 
the balance of the purchase price. Plaintiffs' exercised 
1 Utah Code 57-1-32 was originally enacted by the Ut 
Legislature in 1961 but was amended in 1985. L. 1961/ C 
181/ Sec. 14; 1985/ Ch. 68/ Sec. 4. 
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t h e i r power of s a l e under the t r u s t deed and sold the 
property. More than three months a f t e r the t r u s t e e ' s 
s a l e / t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' brought an a c t i o n c la iming a 
de f i c i ency on the note in excess of the proceeds received 
from t h e s a l e . D e f e n d a n t ' s moved t o d i s m i s s the 
complaint on the grounds that P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint was 
n o t f i l e d in a t i m e l y manner under t h e s t a t u t e . 
P l a i n t i f f s were a l lowed to amend t h e i r complaint and 
a l l e g e d breach of c o n t r a c t by D e f e n d a n t s . The t r i a l 
court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants 
and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dec is ion of the 
t r i a l court . 
In affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss 
the Plaintiffs' Complaint/ the Utah Supreme Court ruled: 
. . . section 57-1-32 provides the exclusive 
procedure for securing a deficiency judgment 
following a trustee's sale of the real 
property under a deed of trust . . . Since 
Plaintiffs' action was not filed within three 
months of the date of the trustee's sale of 
the real property/ the trial court did not 
err in ruling that Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to a deficiency judgment. Cox v. 
Green/ 696 P.2d 1207/ 1208 (Utah 1985). 
The Supreme Court's reasoning for the Cox decision 
is clear. When an obligation is secured by a trust deed 
and a trustee's sale is held on the property securing the 
obligation/ the exclusive procedure to recover a balance 
due on the obligation is set forth in Utah Code 57-1-32 
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and must be brought within three months. If a creditor 
fails to bring an action within three months from the 
date of the trustee's sale/ the creditor is barred from 
bringing any other action to recover the balance due on 
the obligation. 
In the case at bar/ the debtors (Mr. Sachter) gave 
a trust deed note and a trust deed to the Plaintiffs on 
May 4/ 1984. (R. 2, 112/ 113/ 118/ 121/ 124). The trust 
deed note that was secured by the trust deed was due on 
January 1/ 1985. (R. 5 ) . The trust deed was later 
subordinated by the Plaintiffs without the Defendants 
knowledge/ to the interest of a third party lending 
institution. (R. 141/ 118/ 121/ 124). The January 1/ 
1985 payment due date came and passed and the Sachter 
obligation was not called due, or was payment ever 
requested to be made from Mr. Sachter; no notice of 
default was ever given to Mr. Sachter by either Plaintiff 
or by the holder of the first trust deed. (R. 129). On 
March 17/ 1987 the holder of the first trust deed sold 
the property at a public trustee's sale. (R. 48). 
Plaintiffs having notice/ nevertheless/ did not bid at 
the trustee's sale. (R. 119). 
On August 19/ 1987/ Plaintiffs commenced a 
deficiency action by filing a Complaint in the Second 
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J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court of Weber County. (R. 1 ) . More 
than f i v e months had passed between the time of the 
t r u s t e e ' s s a l e o f t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y s e c u r i n g Mr. 
S a c h t e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n ( i f a n y ) / and t h e f i l i n g of 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint. (R. 1/ 2 ) . 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint i s a d e f i c i e n c y a c t i o n to 
recover the balance due upon the ob l iga t ion for which the 
t rus t deed was g iven by Mr. Sachter to P l a i n t i f f s as 
s e c u r i t y f o r t h e o b l i g a t i o n . (R. 1/ 2, 3 ) . The 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint a l l e g e s that Mr. Sachter executed a 
t r u s t deed note in the o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p a l amount of 
$38,604.59 together with i n t e r e s t at 11% per annum, that 
the note was secured by a deed of t rus t dated May 4/ 1984 
and that the deed of trust was a second l i e n on property 
l o c a t e d a t approximate ly 30th S t r e e t and Washington 
Boulevard in Ogden City/ Utah. (R. 2) . 
The P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t on 
March 17/ 1987 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/ 
which held the f i r s t l i e n on the proper ty / so ld the 
property at a public t r u s t e e ' s s a l e . The P l a i n t i f f s ' 
Complaint s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l e g e s that proceeds from the 
t r u s t e e ' s sa le were i n s u f f i c i e n t to cover the ob l iga t ions 
c r e a t e d by the n o t e . (R. 3 s e e paragraph No. 10 of 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint). 
From the face of P l a i n t i f f s * Complaint/ i t i s c lear 
t h a t t h i s i s an a c t i o n for a d e f i c i e n c y judgment to 
r e c o v e r the balance due upon the ob l iga t ion which was 
secured by a trust deed. The P l a i n t i f f has brought an 
a c t i o n t o accomplish e x a c t l y what the language of Utah 
Code 57 -1 -32 c o v e r s , i . e . / r e c o v e r on an o b l i g a t i o n 
secured by a trust deed. The proceeds of the sa le were 
a l l e g e d l y i n s u f f i c i e n t to cover the ob l igat ion created by 
the note as secured by a deed of t r u s t . There fore , 
P l a i n t i f f s had three months t o br ing i t s d e f i c i e n c y 
act ion or be forever barred from seeking recovery of the 
o b l i g a t i o n . The P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d to bring an action in 
any form within the three month period. The P l a i n t i f f s 
are now barred from a s s e r t i n g any c la im a g a i n s t Mr. 
Sachter. 
Accord ing t o Cox , a c o m p l a i n t r e f e r e n c i n g a 
promissory note or breach of contract or any other action 
for f a i l u r e to pay an ob l iga t ion secured by a trust deed 
would be barred by Utah Code 57-1-32 i f not commenced 
within three months from the date of the t r u s t e e ' s s a l e . 
The Utah L e g i s l a t u r e has c r e a t e d a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e 
regard ing o b l i g a t i o n s secured by t r u s t d e e d s . The 
s t a t u t e i s Utah Code 57-1-19-36 . The P l a i n t i f f s obtained 
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the benef i t s of tha t s t a t u t e and conversely/ must now be 
bound by i t s r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e c a s e of 
Concepts/ Inc . v. F i r s t Securi ty Realty Services/ Inc . / 
743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court 
held t h a t f a i l u r e to br ing a deficiency action within 
three months af ter the sale of property terminated a l l of 
the d e b t o r ' s remaining o b l i g a t i o n s . In Concepts/ Inc . 
the d e b t o r ' s ( t r u s t o r s ) gave t r u s t deeds to secure a 
large loan. The debtor fa i led to perform under the t r u s t 
deed no tes . A t r u s t e e ' s sale was held. More than three 
months l a t e r P l a i n t i f f s commenced an action to recover a 
deficiency due under the no tes . The t r i a l court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the c r e d i t o r / but the 
Supreme Court reversed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s dec i s i on and 
reaffirmed the Cox decis ion. 
[ C r e d i t o r s ] had t h r e e months to i n i t i a t e 
ac t ion to recover any ba lance due on the 
obl iga t ions for which the t r u s t deeds were 
g iven a s s e c u r i t y . Utah Code Annotated 
Section 57-1-32. Once a_ t r u s t deed sale has 
been made/ t h a t remedy i s t h e e x c l u s i v e 
remedy under s t a t u t e . Cf. Cox v. Green/ 696 
P.2d 1207 ( U t a h 1 9 8 5 ) . " . . . 
[ C r e d i t o r s ] f a i l u r e to b r ing a de f i c i ency 
act ion within three months a f t e r the sale of 
the property terminated a l l of the [debtors] 
remaining o b l i g a t i o n s . . . . " Concepts/ 
Inc . v. F i r s t Security Realty Services/ Inc . / 
743 P.2d 1158/ 1161. 
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Concepts/ Inc. is square with the case at bar. 
Here the Creditors (Plaintiffs) knew that Cundicks had 
failed to perform under both the Trust Deed Notes. (R. 
129/ 130). A trustee's sale had been conducted by the 
holder of the first trust deed. Thereafter/ Plaintiffs 
commenced their action to recover the obligation secured 
by its trust deed which action was filed more than three 
months after the sale. (R. 2). 
The only logical conclusion for this Court to reach 
after reviewing the Cox case and the Concepts/ Inc. case 
and by comparing them with the case at barf is that 
Plaintiffs' Complaint against Mr. Sachter is barred by 
the three month limitation set forth in Utah Code 57-1-
32. Therefore/ this Court should reverse the lower 
court's decision and grant Mr. Sachter's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
A. THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS WRITTEN TWO SEPARATE 
STATUTES , ONE TO GOVERN OBLIGATIONS SECURED BY TRUST 
DEEDS AND ONE TO GOVERN OBLIGATIONS SECURED BY MORTGAGES. 
THE CASE AT BAR IS CONTROLLED BY THE STATUTE THAT GOVERNS 
OBLIGATIONS SECURED BY TRUST DEEDS. 
It is anticipated that Plaintiffs will argue that 
because they did not conduct the Trustee's Sale on March 
17/ 1987; but that the sale was conducted by the first 
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lienor/ the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Title 
57 of the Utah Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 
In light of the specific language of Title 57-1-19 et 
seg., such an argument is without merit. 
Utah Code 57-1-32 states in pertinent part as 
follows: "At any time within three months after any sale 
of property under a trust deed . . . an action may be 
commenced". The Utah Legislature could have used words 
restricting this section only to the party conducting the 
trustee's sale, but it did not. The Legislature, 
instead, chose the language "any sale of property under a 
trust deed". The broad language of the statute requires 
that if any sale is conducted pursuant to a trust deed, 
then any action to recover on other obligations secured 
by trust deeds on the same property must be brought 
within three months after the sale. Should individuals 
holding obligations secured by a trust deed on the same 
property fail to bring an action within the three month 
period, they are barred from bringing any other action to 
recover the obligation secured by the trust deed. See 
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985), and Concepts, 
Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 
1158 (Utah 1987). 
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Under Title 57 of the Utah Code, creditors holding 
obligations secured by trust deeds may exercise a power 
of sale or they may elect to conduct a judicial 
foreclosure under Title 78 of the Utah Code. A 
distinction between Title 57 and Title 78 of the Utah 
Code will be drawn hereafter. If any creditor conducts 
any sale under Title 57/ then the three month rule, under 
Utah Code 57-1-32 is automatically invoked against all 
creditors holding obligations secured by trust deeds on 
the property. Thus all Creditors holding obligations 
secured by a trust deed are governed by Utah Code Title 
57 once any creditor holding an obligation secured by a 
trust deed elects the power of sale under said Title. 
This conclusion is supported by the Utah Supreme Court 
case of Randall v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 (Utah 
1984). 
In Randall, there were at least three creditors 
holding obligations secured by trust deeds on the same 
property. The holder of the second trust deed sold the 
property under a power of sale. Justice Dallin Oaks 
began the Courts opinion by stating "This is a case of 
first impression on the duties of the trustee with 
respect to the excess proceeds of sale under our Act 
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Relating to Trust Deeds, U.C.A/ 1953/ sections 57-1-19 to 
36." (emphasis added). Randall at page 220. 
The above statement by Justice Oaks makes it very 
clear that the Utah Legislature has created a specific 
Act Relating to Trust Deeds. That act is codified at 
Utah Code 57-1-19 thru 57-1-36 (1987-1988). The case at 
bar relates to two trust deeds and is specifically 
controlled by the Utah Code sections 57-1-19 to 57-1-36. 
Justice Oaks went on to state in Randall: 
The Legislature has provided that the 
beneficiary has the option of foreclosing a 
deed of trust either by power of sale or by 
judicial foreclosure. Section 57-1-23. If 
MZ&C had elected judicial foreclosure/ 
Randall and any other junior interest would 
have had a right of redemption upon paying 
MZ&C the amount of its purchase price plus 
6%. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f). 
Since MZ&C elected to foreclose its deed of 
trust by trustee power of sale# Randall did 
not have a statutory right of redemption. 
Section 57-1-28 (2). Under power of sale, 
junior interests are protected by the 
requirement that the trustee distribute any 
surplus proceeds to the person legally 
entitled thereto. Randall v. Valley Title/ 
681 P.2d 219/ 221 (Utah 1984) . 
In the instant case/ the first lien holder elected 
to the power of sale under Title 57/ (57-1-23). At that 
moment/ Mr. Sachter no longer had a right of redemption; 
just like in the Randall case. Because Mr. Sachter did 
not have a right of redemption/ Title 57 provides him 
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certain protections/ specifically/ a three month 
limitation for a deficiency action. The Legislature 
created a quid pro quo for the loss of the redemption 
rights under Title 57. The trade off for the right of 
redemption is a three month bar for recovery of 
obligations secured by trust deeds when the property is 
sold under a trustee power of sale. 
The creditor who has a trust deed to the debtors 
property receives the benefits of Title 57/ for example: 
1. There is a short/ non-judicial/ process in 
obtaining free and clear title to the real property and 
thereby securing payment; 
2. There is no six month waiting period wherein 
the debtor or any junior lien holder could redeem the 
property; 
3. The creditor is not bound by the one action 
rule of Title 78; 
4. The creditor has an inexpensive means of 
obtaining the collateral; 
5. The creditor can select collateral in advance 
of making the loan and predetermine the adequacy or value 
of the collateral; 
6. The creditor can elect not to exercise the 
power of sale and proceed judicially on its promissory 
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n o t e # or by way o f a j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e and 
automatical ly obtain the de f i c i ency or money judgment; 
7. The cred i tor i s secured and perfected in the 
c o l l a t e r a l / i f the debtor dec lares bankruptcy. 
But once any c r e d i t o r e x e r c i s e s the non- judic ia l 
r ight of s e l l i n g the c o l l a t e r a l by way of a trust deed/ 
a l l o t h e r t r u s t deed holders are bound by that remedy. 
Because once the c o l l a t e r a l has been taken from the 
debtor by way of a n o n - j u d i c i a l t r u s t e e ' s s a l e , a l l 
o b l i g a t i o n s secured by that c o l l a t e r a l / t h e o r e t i c a l l y / 
s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s a t i s f i e d by t h e v a l u e o f t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l . I f a c r e d i t o r a s s e r t s t h e v a l u e was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y the o b l i g a t i o n / i t has three 
months to i n i t i a t e a de f i c i ency a c t i o n . This requirement 
by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e / i s based on a ba lanc ing of the 
b e n e f i t s g iven to c r e d i t o r s who e l e c t t o t a k e r e a l 
property as secur i ty by way of a t rus t deed and as a quid 
pro quo the need to p r o t e c t d e b t o r s who l o s e t h e i r 
property and have no r i g h t s of redemption. 
Trust deed holders in a second pos i t ion may protect 
t h e i r s e c u r i t y / once the f i r s t l i e n holder has e l ec t ed 
the t r u s t deed remed ie s / by b r i n g i n g the f i r s t l i e n 
h o l d e r s o b l i g a t i o n c u r r e n t . This r i s k was known and 
assumed in advance by the second trust deed holder. 
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An additional public policy consideration for this 
particular trade off is the need for finality. 
Therefore/ the Legislature has incorporated these public 
policy considerations into Title 57 by creating the three 
month "window" to allow creditors the opportunity to 
pursue the debtor, but protected the debtor from endless 
legal actions. The Legislature has determined that once 
the three month period has passed, no one can bring any 
action against the debtor when the property was sold by a 
trustee's power of sale. This limitation on creditors 
was created simply because the debtor in this 
circumstance no longer has a right of redemption. All 
redemption rights have been forfeited because of the 
election of the trustee's sale under Title 57, and the 
three month "window" thus protects both the creditor and 
the debtor. 
Further, in the case at bar, had there been a 
surplus from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
trustee's sale, said surplus would have legally belonged 
to the Plaintiffs. It is not the fault of Mr. Sachter 
there was no surplus from the sale of the property. 
In the case of Utah Mortgage and Loan Company v. 
Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a fact pattern involving an obligation secured 
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by a trust deed, but no power of sale was ever exercised. 
The debtor retained the benefit of the collateral. 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the case was controlled 
by the "one action" Rule of 78-37-1. 
The Court held "The purpose of (78-37-1) was to 
eliminate harassment of debtors and multiple litigation . 
. . Utah Mortgage at page 45. The Court went on to hold: 
. . . when a creditor uses up the security 
which it was agreed would stand good for his 
debt, he may not look to the debtor 
personally for any deficiency. In any event, 
that principal would not apply when the 
security has been lost or disposed of without 
any fault or blame worthy conduct on the part 
of the creditor . . . . in such instance, an 
action may be brought upon the note without 
going through a fruitless procedure of 
foreclosure on non existent security. 
However, if the security is lost or disposed 
of because of any failure or neglect of the 
creditor, he deprives himself both of the 
right to foreclosure on the security and to 
seek a deficiency from the debtor. Utah 
Mortgage at page 45. 
The case at bar is not controlled by Utah Code 78-
37-1. However, the policy considerations incorporated in 
78-37-1 by the Utah Legislature, should be applied to the 
instant case. If the creditor has lost his security 
interest because of his own failure or neglect, he is 
barred from seeking a deficiency from the debtor; the 
creditor is estopped from harassing the debtor. 
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In the case at bar/ the creditor (the Plaintiffs) 
lost their security because of their own failure or 
neglect. They subordinated the trust deed to Citizens 
Bank without knowledge of Mr. Sachter. (R. 141, 113, 118, 
121, 124). Plaintiffs did not attend the trustee1s sale 
and enter a bid to protect their security or take any 
other action to protect their second lien position from 
being lost. (R. 119). Further, Plaintiffs waited until 
more than two years after the Trust Deed Note was due to 
try and collect on the Trust Deed Note. (R. 129, 130). 
Under the facts of the instant case and the reasoning in 
the Utah Mortgage case, Plaintiffs should be barred from 
prosecuting a complaint against Mr. Sachter. 
Mr. Sachter should therefore not be punished 
because of the acts or omissions of the Plaintiffs. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the ruling of the 
lower court and dismiss Plaintiffs' action with 
prejudice. 
B. PLAINTIFFS RELIANCE ON CASE LAW NOT INTERPRETING 
TITLE 57 IS INAPPOSITE, 
In the Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to Mr. 
Sachter's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs argue that 
Utah Code 57-1-32 has no application to the case at bar. 
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R-35). The Plaintiffs cite the case of Cache Valley 
Banking Company v. Logan Lodge No, 1453 B.O.P.A./ 56 P.2d 
1046 (Utah 1936) to support this contention. 
It should be noted that Cache Valley Banking 
Company/ was decided in 1936. Title 57 (Utah's Act 
Relating to Trust Deeds) was enacted in 1961 and amended 
in 1985. The case of Cache Valley Banking Company/ has 
been subrogated by legislation/ which is now controlling/ 
over actions involving trust deeds. Any argument by 
Plaintiffs that rely on Cache Valley Banking Company for 
authority regarding trusts deed sales must be 
disregarded. This court's decisions are now governed in 
matters dealing with trust deeds by Utah Legislation 
passed in 1961 and amended in 1985/ and mandatory case 
law that have been decided since the passage of Title 57. 
Current case law and statutory law are relied on by Mr. 
Sachter herein. 
Both Plaintiffs and the court below failed to 
recognize the critical distinction between recovery of 
obligations that are secured by trust deeds, and 
obligations that are secured by mortgages. The 
distinction is critical because of the remedies and 
defenses provided by legislation and common law for each 
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of the different types of obligations and their 
securities. 
A trust deed is a security interest. A mortgage 
is also a security interest. The state legislature has 
recognized that there is distinction between the two 
security interests and has written two separate code 
sections governing the respective security interests. 
The primary and relevant distinctions between Code 
Section 57-1-32 and 78-37-1 are as follows: 
Utah Code 57-1-32 provides a three month limitation 
on subsequent judicial actions following the trustees' 
sale. A creditor has three months following a trustee 
sale to commence an action "to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as 
security". (Utah Code 57-1-32). Under the Mortgage 
Foreclosure Statute, Utah Code 78-37-1, however, the rule 
in Utah is the "one action rule." In the words of the 
Utah Legislature, "There can be one action for the 
recovery of any debt . . . secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate, which action must be in accordance with 
this chapter." (Utah Code 78-37-1). 
Thus, where an action is commenced regarding a debt 
that is or has been secured by a trust deed, then the 
three month limitation on actions of section 57-1-32 
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governs that action. Where/ on the other hand, an action 
is commenced concerning a debt that is or has been 
secured by a mortgage, then the "one action rule" of 
section 78-37-1 governs the action. 
It must be remembered that section 57-1-23 allows 
for a trust deed to be sold by a power of sale or to be 
foreclosed upon like a mortgage under a judicial 
foreclosure. That is, under 57-1-23 and 57-1-32 a 
creditor has a power of sale plus a deficiency action, to 
collect his obligation within three months from the sale 
and the debtor has no rights of redemption, in the 
alternative the creditor may elect a judicial foreclosure 
and automatically obtain a judgment and possible 
deficiency and be bound by the one action rule of Utah 
Code 78-37-1, but the debtor receives the right of 
redemption. 
The Utah Supreme Court cases of Cox and Concept, 
Inc. are on point with the case at bar. All three cases 
involve obligations secured by trust deeds. Creditors 
elected to exercise the power of sale granted under Utah 
Code 57-1-32. No mortgages are involved and, clearly, 
Utah Code 78-37-1 was not even considered by the court in 
Cox or Concept, Inc. for remedy purposes. The same 
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consideration should be given to the case at bar by this 
Court. 
Utah case law consistently holds that when a 
judicial sale (foreclosure action) is commenced/ Utah 
Code 78-37-1 governs the matter. This line of cases only 
applies to judicial sales or judicial foreclosure actions 
and has no application where a trustee power of sale was 
exercised. 
The case of Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, 
Inc./ 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983) was decided prior to the 
Cox and Concept/ Inc. cases and did not deal with a 
trustee's sale. Thus/ the Lockhart case is not 
controlling on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs are 
barred from bringing an action to recover on an 
obligation secured by a trust deed. 
Even if/ the Lockhart case were applicable and 
could be used to decide the instant case, Lockhart is 
inapposite to the consideration of the case at bar 
because Lockhart involved a judicial foreclosure. (Zions 
filed a cross complaint . . . to foreclose its senior 
lien on the subject property. Lockhart at page 1344). 
Thus/ even though the Utah Supreme Court applied Utah 
Code 78-37-1 in Lockhart / it is not applicable to the 
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case at bar because there has been no judicial 
foreclosure by any party to this case. 
In the instant case there was an exercise of the 
power of sale under Utah Code 57-1-32 only. Therefore/ 
this Court should reverse the decision of the lower court 
and grant Mr. Sachter's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 
Complaint. 
In the case of First Security Bank of Utah/ N.A. v. 
Felger/ 658 F.Supp 175 (D.Utah 1987)/ the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah held/ "the one action rule 
applies to trust deeds as well as mortgages." Felger at 
page 181. The Federal District Court relied on Lockhart 
and Utah Mortgage to arrive at this conclusion. 
The Felger case involves a judicial foreclosure as 
in Lockhart. Therefore/ Utah Code 78-37-1 would be 
applicable in those cases. However/ in the case at bar 
there has not been a judicial foreclosure and Utah Code 
78-37-1 is not applicable. The Felger case does not 
have application to the case at bar where no judicial 
foreclosure has been commenced. Further/ the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah ruled in 
Felger that: 
Section 57-1-32 limits recovery on notes 
secured by non-judicial foreclosed trust 
deeds . . . . The purpose of Section 57-1-32 
is to protect the debtor/ who in a non-
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j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e h a s no r i g h t o f 
r e d e m p t i o n / from a c r e d i t o r who c o u l d 
purchase the property at the sa le for a low 
price and then hold the debtor l i a b l e for a 
large d e f i c i e n c y , Felger at page 183, 
The C o u r t ' s r u l e in the Fe lger case i s l o g i c a l and 
appl ies to the case at bar. 
Because the f a c t s of the instant case show t h e i r 
was a n o n - j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e or t r u s t e e ' s power of 
sale, and P l a i n t i f f s did nothing to prevent the low bid 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to pro tec t 
P l a i n t i f f s ' s e c u r i t y / the P l a i n t i f f s are bound by Utah 
Code 57-1-32. Mr. Sachter has no r i g h t of redemption 
because of the Federa l Deposit Insurance Corporation's 
exerc ise of the power of s a l e / and to protect Mr. Sachter 
from harassment by c r e d i t o r s / the three month l i m i t a t i o n 
rule of Utah Code 57-1-32 came into e f f e c t at the time of 
the t r u s t e e ' s s a l e . Since P l a i n t i f f s did not commence 
there action to recover on the obl igat ion secured by a 
trust deed within the three month period/ P l a i n t i f f s are 
now barred from bringing a c laim a g a i n s t Mr. S a c h t e r . 
Therefore/ t h i s Court should grant Mr. Sachter ' s Motion 
to Dismiss P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint. 
The c a s e a t bar and the above c i t e d c a s e s are 
squared with each o ther . Therefore/ t h i s court should 
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reverse the decision of the trial court and grant Mr. 
Sachter's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint* 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECADSE THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT MUST BE ADJUDICATED AND 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
in pertinent part: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim . . 
. may ,. . • move with or without supporting 
affidavits for summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof • . • . The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings/ depositions/ answers to 
interrogatories/ and admissions on file# 
together with the affidavits/ if any/ show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held regarding Rule 56 that: 
When reviewing the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment the facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the parties 
opposing the motion and those parties are to 
be given the benefit of all inferences which 
might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
Summary judgment is proper only when the 
[movant is] entitled to judgments as a matter 
of law on the undisputed facts. Payne v. 
Myers/ 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). 
Further/ the Utah Court of Appeals is bound by the 
standard of review found in Concepts/ Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services/ Inc./ 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987): 
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B e c a u s e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a c a s e by summary 
judgment d e n i e s the b e n e f i t o f t r i a l on t h e 
m e r i t s , we r e v i e w the f a c t s and i n f e r e n c e s in 
the l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to the party a g a i n s t 
whom the judgment was g r a n t e d . Concepts I n c . 
at Page 1159 . Cf. A t l a s Corp. v . The C l o v i s 
Nat ional Bank/ 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) . 
Therefore / when c o n s i d e r i n g or rev iewing the f a c t s 
in l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o Mr. Sachter / the o n l y l o g i c a l 
c o n c l u s i o n i s f o r t h e t h i s Court t o r e v e r s e the lower 
c o u r t ' s Order g r a n t i n g summary judgment and remand t h e 
case for t r i a l on the m e r i t s . 
In the c a s e of Lockhart Company v . E q u i t a b l e R e a l t y 
Company/ 657 P . 2 d 1333 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) / t h e Utah Supreme 
Court s t a t e d : 
T h i s c o u r t r e v i e w e d t h e s t a n d a r d f o r 
a p p l y i n g r u l e 5 6 / Utah Rule o f C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e i n t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n o f 
Bowen v . R i v e r t o n C i t y / 656 P . 2 d 434 
( 1 9 8 2 ) . Summary Judgment i s proper on ly 
i f t h e p l e a d i n g s / t h e d e p o s i t i o n s / 
a f f i d a v i t s and a d m i s s i o n s show t h a t 
t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l 
f a c t and t h a t t h e m o v i n g p a r t y i s 
e n t i t l e d t o judgment as a matter of law 
[ c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ] . I f t h e r e i s any 
d o u b t o r u n c e r t a i n t y c o n c e r n i n g 
q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t / the doubt s h o u l d be 
r e s o l v e d in favor of the opposing p a r t y . 
Thus/ the c o u r t must e v a l u a t e a l l t h e 
e v i d e n c e and a l l r e a s o n a b l e r e f e r e n c e s 
f a i r l y drawn from t h e e v i d e n c e i n a 
l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p a r t y 
opposing summary judgment. Lockhart a t 
page 1 3 3 5 . 
The Supreme Court went on in Lockhart t o deny the 
P l a i n t i f f s Motion for Summary Judgment b e c a u s e o f t h e 
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Defendants affirmative defense and Motion to Dismiss 
based upon Plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah 
Statutory Law. Lockhart at page 1335. 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff made Motion for 
Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiffs' Motion was supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
In Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of C. A. 
Ferrin. Ferrin's Affidavit states that Mr. Sachter had 
not paid any amounts on the trust deed note and that 
Sachter, Durbano and Mortensen were makers of the trust 
deed note. The Memorandum in support merely restates the 
allegations contained in Plaintiffs1 Complaint. (R. 53). 
Neither Sachter/ Durbano nor Mortensen signed the 
trust deed note as makers but as guarantors or 
accommodation signatures. Durbano/ Sachter nor Mortensen 
did not receive any value for their signing the trust 
deed note. (R. 112 and R. 118/ 121/ 124). 
The trust deed note/ which is the subject of this 
dispute/ is dated May 4/ 1984 and was due eight months 
later on January 1/ 1985. The trust deed note was to be 
paid in one payment. The trust deed note has the names 
of Steven F. Cundick and Marlene H. Cundick typed under 
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signatures lines/ but no other names are typed under the 
signatures lines. (R. 5 ) . This confusion regarding 
guarantors/accommodation signatures or the lack of value 
received is for the trier of fact to clarify and 
determine. 
Mr. Sachterfs response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment disputes all material facts set forth in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 112 et seq.). Therefore, genuine 
issues of material fact exist that must be adjudicated. 
The Plaintiffs' subordinated the Sachter trust deed 
to the security interest of Citizens Bank/ i.e. the trust 
deed securing the trust deed note given by Mr. Sachter to 
Plaintiff. Mr. Sachter was not aware of the 
subordination and loss of their priority security 
position. (R. 141/ 119/ 122/ 125). The subordination by 
Plaintiff of the trust deed placed an increased burden of 
risk upon the guarantors to which the guarantors were 
unaware and did not consent to. 
Under the provisions of Article 3 of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) a creditor is allowed to 
join a third person to a debtor's obligation. The third 
party who signs such obligation commits himself to answer 
for the debt or default of the debtor. Section 78-3-416 
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(Utah Code 1987-1988). Title 78 recognizes this type of 
a party as an "accommodation party". 
1. Accommodation party is one who signs the 
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his 
name to another party to it. Section 3-416(4) states as 
follows: 
No words of guarantee added to the 
signature of a sole maker or acceptor 
affect his liability on the instrument. 
Such words added to the signature of one 
of two or more makers or acceptors 
creates a presumption that the 
signature is for the accommodation of 
the others. 
Additional signatures to a promissory note/ by 
parties who receive no consideration for their signatures 
or by the transaction/ are referred as either "sureties" 
or as "accommodation signatures". In the case at bar/ 
Durbano/ Sachter and Mortensen are clearly accommodation 
signatures or sureties to the obligation owed by Cundick 
to the Plaintiffs/ since these three individuals did not 
receive the land/ but were in fact the sellers of the 
land/ and owed the original obligation which essentially 
was being assumed by Cundicks. As between the surety and 
the debtor/ it is clear that the debtor has a primary 
obligation to pay the debt. Since the creditor is 
entitled to only one performance and the debtor receives 
the benefit of the transaction/ the sureties obligation 
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i s undertaken with the expectat ion that the debtor w i l l 
meet h i s commitment t o the c r e d i t o r . I f / f o r some 
r e a s o n / t h e c r e d i t o r r e l e a s e s the p r i n c i p a l debtor 
(Cundicks) and thereby deprives the surety of the r ight 
to recover from the pr inc ipal debtor/ or i f the cred i tor 
f a i l s to protect a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t in the c o l l a t e r a l 
given by the debtor and so i s unable to recover h i s debt 
out of the c o l l a t e r a l / the s u r e t i e s burden w i l l have been 
i n c r e a s e d . The law assumes that the s u r e t y has not 
ascended to such increased burdens. Consequent ly / the 
law has t r a d i t i o n a l l y held that conduct by the cred i tor 
which i n c r e a s e s t h e s u r e t i e s r i s k " d i s c h a r g e s t h e 
surety"/ as s tated in Sect ion 3-606 of the UCC. 
The h o l d e r d i s c h a r g e s any p a r t y t o t h e 
instrument to the e x t e n t that without such 
part ies consent the holder. 
(a) Without e x p r e s s r e s e r v a t i o n of r i g h t s 
r e l e a s e s or a g r e e s not to sue any p e r s o n 
a g a i n s t whom the party has the knowledge of 
the holder a r ight of recourse or a g r e e s to 
suspend the r i g h t to en force a g a i n s t such 
person/ instrument or c o l l a t e r a l or otherwise 
discharges such a person/ . . . or 
(b) Unjus t i f i ab ly impairs any c o l l a t e r a l for 
the ins trument given by or on behalf of the 
party or any person against whom he has the 
r i g h t of r e c o u r s e . (See White and Summers/ 
Uniform Commercial Code / Second E d i t i o n / 
Hornbook S e r i e s / 1980/ Section 13-12 through 
S e c t i o n 13-15 for an in depth a n a l y s i s of 
accommodation p a r t i e s o b l i g a t i o n . Page 516-
535.) 
A 1 
In the r e c e n t c a s e of Carrier Brokers/ I n c . v . 
Spanish Trai l / 77 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah Ct. of App. 1988)/ 
the Utah Court o f A p p e a l s has addressed the i s s u e 
r e g a r d i n g a s u b s t i t u t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l / and t h e 
subsequent r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of accommodation s ignatures to 
promissory n o t e s when a c o l l a t e r a l s u b s t i t u t i o n or 
m o d i f i c a t i o n has taken p l a c e . There were two debtors 
involved in the Carrier Brokers case; debtor/ Stoof and 
debtor/ Bai ley . 
Stoof and B a i l e y entered into a contract for the 
purchase of products from the Coca-cola Company. Stoof 
and Bailey were unable to s a t i s f y that contract . Stoof 
negotiated by himself a modif icat ion to the contract and 
memorial ized t h a t m o d i f i c a t i o n by an addendum to the 
a g r e e m e n t . However/ B a i l e y was not aware o f t h e 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l or the modification of the 
i n t e r e s t rate unt i l there was a de fau l t . 
In rul ing on Carrier Brokers/ the Court of Appeals 
held that Stoof had knowledge of the s u b s t i t u t i o n and 
because of S t o o f ' s knowledge and involvement in t h i s 
subs t i tu t ion / the Court was correct in finding that Stoof 
was estopped from denying l i a b i l i t y . However/ Bai ley on 
the other hand/ knew noth ing of the s u b s t i t u t i o n of 
c o l l a t e r a l unt i l the loan was in de fau l t . Because Bai ley 
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had no knowledge of the subs t i tu t ion his conduct could 
not have misled the P l a i n t i f f s . Therefore / the t r i a l 
court was correct in f inding that Bailey was not estopped 
from c la iming t h a t t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l 
released him from l i a b i l i t y . 
In t h e c a s e a t Bar/ t h e f a c t that P l a i n t i f f s 
subordinated the ir l i e n on the c o l l a t e r a l wi thout the 
knowledge of Mr. Sachter (R. 141/ 119/ 122/ 125)/ r a i s e s 
a genuine i ssue of material fact and law as to whether or 
not there should be a r e l e a s e of l i a b i l i t y as to the 
accommodation s ignatures (Durbano/ Sachter and Mortensen) 
of the obl igat ion created by the trust deed note signed 
by Cundicks. The lower court was not correct in granting 
summary judgment to P l a i n t i f f s . This court should 
r e v e r s e and remand the c a s e to the lower c o u r t for 
adjudicat ion. 
There was a l so a question raised as to the value of 
the property that secured the trust deed note . (R. 119/ 
122/ 1 2 5 ) . A l s o / the amount claimed by the P l a i n t i f f 
t h a t Mr. Sachter owed under the t r u s t deed note was 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d isputed. (R. 108/ 119/ 122/ 125) . In other 
words/ there are c l e a r l y several ques t ions of m a t e r i a l 
fact as to the amount owed/ i f any/ by Mr. Sachter to the 
P l a i n t i f f . 
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All of the above averments by Mr, Sachter were 
supported by Affidavit. (R. 118,121,124). Plaintiffs 
replied to Mr. Sachter's response, by Affidavit. Clearly 
the Affidavits tendered by the Plaintiff in support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 53, 59) as well as 
the Affidavits tendered by Mr. Sachter, et al. (R. 118, 
121, 124) indicates a dispute of many material facts, 
e.g., whether Mr. Sachter was released from the debt, 
whether the value of the collateral should satisfy the 
debt, whether there is a debt owed at all, and, if so, 
how much the debt actually totals. Summary judgment is 
not proper when material questions of fact exist. 
Therefore, the lower Court should be reversed and the 
matter remanded for adjudication. 
There is also a question raised in the record as to 
whether the Plaintiffs' caused the deficiency, if one 
existed, by their own acts or omissions. Plaintiffs' 
reply brief sets forth several transactions between 
Plaintiff and Mr. Sachter. (R. 128 et s e q . ) . 
Specifically, the facts set forth in Plaintiffs' reply 
brief states: 
No. 6 . In order t o f i n a n c e t h e i r purchase , 
t h e C u n d i c k ' s b o r r o w e d $ 3 7 , 3 0 2 . 0 6 from 
C i t i z e n ' s Bank, which amount was secured by a 
t r u s t deed on the proper ty purchased by t h e 
C u n d i c k s . C i t i z e n ' s Bank required t h a t the 
t r u s t deed be i n a f i r s t p o s i t i o n on t h e 
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property/ therefore in order to facilitate 
the sale and to reduce the amount of debt 
owed by the Defendants/ Sachter/ Durbano and 
Mortensen# Plaintiffs agreed to subordinate 
their trust deed covering the property 
purchased by the Cundicks to the trust deed 
of Citizen's Bank. (Adams Aff. at para. 5/ 
R. 130) . 
It is clear from the above statement that it was 
the Plaintiffs who agreed to subordinate their trust deed 
and therefore created/ by their own act/ the possibility 
that their security interest could be lost or forfeited 
if the first lien holder Citizen's Bank were to foreclose 
on the property. (R. 132). 
Further/ the Plaintiffs knew that the Cundicks were 
the purchasers of the property. (R. 133). It therefore/ 
stands to reason there is a question of fact as to 
whether or not Mr. Sachter is a guarantor under the 
promissory note. 
There are numerous material questions of fact that 
should have been adjudicated/ but which the lower court 
opted to ignore when it granted summary judgment on 
behalf of the Plaintiffs. This Court should reverse the 
decision of the lower court and remand this matter for 
trial on the issues raised on the pleadings/ affidavits/ 
etc. between the parties. 
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III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT 
CONCERNING THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE UNDERLYING 
PURPOSE OF WRITTEN DOCUMENTS» 
The case at bar involves a dispute over written 
instruments; a trust deed note/ a trust deed/ and the 
sale of the property described on the trust deed which 
was purportedly given as a security interest for the 
obligation due under the trust deed note. Because the 
instant case involves a written document and the intent 
of the parties and the underlying purpose of that 
document are in dispute/ the lower court erred in 
granting Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment when 
issues of material mistake or fradulent transfer would 
require parol evidence prior to adjudication. 
Because Plaintiffs allege and argue that a sale of 
the property occured from DurbanO/ Sachter and Mortensen 
to Cundick/ and the fact that Plaintiffs knew about and 
participated in the sale to Cundick (R. 133)/ there are 
questions as to the intent of the parties and the 
underlying purpose of the trust deed note/ and trust 
deed. Those questions should have been adjudicated. 
Summary judgment was most improper when the intent and 
purposes of those written documents were in question. 
Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining/ Inc./ 740 P.2d 1304 
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(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that in a case 
involving a dispute about the underlying purposes of a 
written document there were factual issues that existed. 
The trial court in Spor inappropriately drew inferences 
as to the parties intent in deciding the issue and in 
granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings in the trial court. 
In the case of W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co./ 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that parol evidence is permissible to show 
purpose and intent of parties to a deed. In the case at 
bar there are questions about the written instruments and 
parol evidence is admissible to show the purpose and 
intent of the documents. However/ the purposes and 
intent of the documents in the case at bar were never 
adjudicated by the lower court. 
Further, the Barnes court held that on motion for 
summary judgment it is not appropriate for the trial 
court to weigh disputed evidence concerning purposes and 
intent but/ rather/ the sole inquiry to be determined 
is whether there is a material fact to be decided. The 
lower court in the case at bar erred in making a decision 
that there were no material issues of fact to be decided. 
Id. at 59. It is of no moment that the evidence on one 
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side may appear to be strong or even compelling/ and 
documentary evidence is not dispositive if the intent and 
purpose of the document are at issue. See Id.7 see also 
Kjar v. Bremley/ 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that summary judgment is not proper unless there are no 
material issues of fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. In the instant case/ 
there are genuine questions of material fact and law as 
to whether or not the moving party is entitled to 
judgment. The Supreme Court has stated: 
It would seem from what has been said that 
the position stated by the parties are 
mutually contradictory. Therefore/ unless 
upon the basis of the submissions it appears 
for a certainty that either one or the other 
is correct/ and therefore/ entitled to 
prevail/ it is necessary that their be a 
trial and resolution of this dispute between 
them. Black at page 44. Utah Mortgage and 
Loan Company/ Inc. v. Blade"? 618 P. 2d 43/44 
(Utah 1980). 
The submissions in the instant case are mutually 
contradictory and do not indicate for a certainty that 
either Mr. Sachter or Plaintiff is correct/ and therefore 
entitled to prevail. It is necessary that there be a 
trial and resolution of this dispute between them. This 
Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and 
remand this matter for trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in denying Defendants1 Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint because Utah Code 57-1-
32 requires an action be commenced to recover on an 
obligation secured by a trustee's deed within three 
months after the exercise of a trust deed power of sale* 
The Plaintiffs failed to commence the action within the 
three month limitation period required under Utah Code 
57-1-32 and Plaintiff should be barred from prosecuting 
any action against Defendants. 
The lower court also erred in granting Plaintiffs1 
Motion for Summary Judgment because there are genuine 
issues of material fact that must be adjudicated. As an 
alternative to the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint/ Defendants/Appellants pray the Court to 
reverse the lower court's Order granting Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment and remanding the matter to the lower 
court for trial. This Court should grant whatever other 
relief it deems appropriate under the circumstances. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED/ this 2~<f~~~ day of July/ 1988. 
>J^ HN H. GEILMANN 
C^ttorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
f nisi ^ttb $ott 
TW) NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, thii note, with Trust Deed securing the Mine, mu»t 
tw surrendered to Trustee for cancellation before reconveyance wil) be made. 
$ J6.b04.59 
1^0 
ryf Ogden , UUh, 
M a y A ^ / , 1 9 84 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order 
0f C. A. FERRIN, JR. AND G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP f 
at h 
UUh, or at such other place as the holder hereof may designate, 
THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOUR AND 59/00 - -
 D0LLARS ($38,604.59 ) , 
together with interest from date at ih* rate of Eleven per cent ( 11 %) per annum on 
tfce lirifcaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
SEE PAYMENT SCHEDULE BELOW. DOLLARS ($ ) 
on the day of , 19 , and the same amount on 
rhc feme day of each succeeding month until the entire unpaid principal with accrued interest hat 
HTLP 'fv.lly paid. Each payment shall be applied first to accrued intereat and the balance to the 
mduetion of principal. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, 
the holder hereof, at holders option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal 
balance and accrued interest immediately due and payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, 
either with or without suit, the undersigned^ jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses 
of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and aU extensions 
of time renewals waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to 
the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part there-
of, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
One (1) payment in the amount of $38,604.59 together with Interest to be paid 
irt fo i l on or before January 1
 9 1985, 
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TRUST DEED ^ f lSf 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this .... Ajth day of Hay. , 19.8.4... 
between DAVID^.^ DJ^ DBA, DMP JISSOCIAT 
J ^ STEVEN ^
 a s TRUSTOR 
whose address is 
(Strwc and number) (City) * '('state') ***** 
WEBER 
.I?.TL?..C.9??M - , as TRUSTEE,* and 
, C. A. FEI^^^ as BENEFICIARY 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH P O W E R OF SALE, the following described property, situated in £?£?£ 
County, State of Utah: 
Part of Lot 26, Block 10, South Ogden Survey, Ogden City, Weber County, 
Utah: Beginning at a point 144.5 feet South and 60 feet West of the 
Northeast corner of Lot 36, said Block 10, and running thence West 82.8 
feet; thence South 90 feet, more or less, to the North line of 30th 
Street; thence East along the North line of 30th Street, 82.8 feet; 
thence North 90 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
04-058-0002. 
Part of Lot 26, Block 10, South Ogden Survey, Ogden City Survey, Weber 
County, Utah: Beginning at a point 144.5 feet South and 142.8 feet West 
of the Northeast corner of Lot 36, Block 10, South Ogden Survey; thence 
South 90 feet, more or less, to the North line of 30th Street as said 
Street was fixed by resolution of the Ogden City Council, September, 1907, 
as shown by the recorded Plat thereof of record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Weber County, Utah; thence West 40 feet; thence North 
90 feet, more or less; thence East 40 feet to the point of beginning. 
04-058-0003. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $...38»6Q4.».59 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner nnd with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced bv Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE Tnjs.re must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings 
a.»d loan association authorized to do such business in Utah: a corporation authorised to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGKfc*. 
1 To keep said property in rood condition and repair: not to remove or demolish n w huilcljf rron. to 
complete or r«*store promptly find in good and workmanlike nnnner nnv IMIIMHIL' whirli mnv fa* uMnjctc*]. 
damaged or destroyed (hereon, to comply with all laws, covenants rtiwi rcMrirlions .meeting said pro|>rriv: not 
to commit or |>crmit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit anv art u|Kin said projwrty in violation of law; to 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property mav be reasonably nccessnrv, the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan secured hereby or any put thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To comment c construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable di) gence to completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth fact* Knowing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state* 
menu therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pro;>crty. Such insurance shall lie carried 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clau«a«s in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ot 
the property damaged. 
3. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence ol title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts ol title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of* evi** 
deuce of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay ail costs, 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes: commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lie:, which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
nece*»Mry therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
6. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in mny other mmnner, Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, ail or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall nave the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
Etrson. by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of eneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorneys fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the col lee ton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and tht waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary riav execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be •old to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
* ~ „., .^^*.ti y isw trustee wimoui aemand 
on Trustor shall sell said propert n the date and at the time and place desif n- d in Mid notice 9^ *""** either as 
a whole or in separate parcels and in such order as it may determine (but subject to anv statutory rig Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property if consistinf of several known lots or narceh shall be^ at public 
auction to the huthrnt bidder the purchase price payable in lawful mom v of the United Stales at the time of 
Mile The person conducting the sale may for any cause he deems expedient postpone the sale from time to 
time untd it shall be completed and m every case notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale provided if the tale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of tale Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold but without any covenant or warranty eipress or implied The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Any person including Bene 
ficiary may bid at the sale Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
espenses of exercising the power of sale ana of the sale including the payment of the Trustees and attorney a 
fees (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustees Deed 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof not then repaid with accrued interest at 10** per annum from date 
of expenditure (4) all other sums then secured hereby and (5) the remainder if any to the person or persona 
legally entitled thereto or the Trustee in its discretion may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county m which the sale took place 
ID Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed 
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto including a reasonable attorney a fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court 
17 Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county m which said property or some part thereof is situated a substitution of trustee From 
the tune the substitution is filed for recora the new trustee shall succeed to all the power* duties authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made in the manner provided by law 
18 This Trust Deed shall apply to mure to the benefit of and bind all parties hereto their heirs legatees 
devisees adminstrators executors successors and assigns All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several The term Beneficiary shall mean the owner and holder including; any pledgee of the note secured 
hereby in this Trust Deed whenever the context requires the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter and the singular number includes the plural 
19 Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed duly executed and acknowledged is made a public 
record as provided by law Trustee ts not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding m which Trustor Beneficiary or Truttee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee 
20 This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21 The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to hun at the address hereinbefore set forth 
Signature of Trustor 
DMP ASSOCIATES^  
$/ Cundick 
Marlene H. Cundick 
' (If Trustor an In 
STATE OF 
COUNTY o j f k ^ l ^ ^ 
On the , AD 19s4 .personally Qay 01  i\ *~r A*/  fS^ftOlSUCLUy 
David L. Durbano,Richard Mortensen, & Paul S<achter,authorized signers 
appeared before me for pMP Associates; and Steven F. Cundick and Marlene H- Cuprliok, 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that c he v executed (fie* 
same ^
 r*V <•* O "i 
Notary Public residing at. ' -J -
Ogden, Utah \ My Commission Expires 2-16-85 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the 
appeared before me 
day of AD 19 personally 
who being b> me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said 
to me that said corporation executed the same 
acknowledged 
Notary Public residing at 
My Commis. on Expires 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAM LIMITED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID DURBANO, ETAL, 
Defendant* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
DAVID E. ROTH, Judge 
Case No. 0053-87 
Date: 12/14/87 
James N. Jones, Reporter 
Fran Lund, Court Clerk 
This is the time set for defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Defendants response to plaintiff's motion for sanctions 
and memorandum in oposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Issue presented by Mr. Durbano. 
Resonse by Mr. Swartz. 
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is denied. 
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is denied. 
Defendant may have 10 days to amend his complaint and 
respond to the summary judgment. 
ADDENDUM D 
fe li 2 3'-; PH fg7 
V . ' c r ~ 
'•' •
 ;> < . : . t A £ 
William P. Schwart, Bar No. 4404 
Shawn C. Ferrin, Bar No. 4832 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
and C.A. FERRIN, JR., 
Pla itiffs, 
v. 
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER, 
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F. 
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H. 
CUNDICK, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil NO.J053-87 
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and 
Richard Mortensen came on for hearing on December 14, 1987. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, 
HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss is denied; 
2. Defendants Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen shall have ten days 
from December 14, 1987 in which to respond to plaintiffs1 Complaint and 
plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be determined by the 
Court pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial 
District Court upon the conclusion of all briefing relating to the motion; 
4. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions filed in response to defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED: D e c e m b e r ^ ? , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED: December / ^T1987 . 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Schwartz 
50 West Broadway, 6th Flotfr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DATED: December , 1987. 
DURBANO & SMITH 
District Court Judge 
Douglas M. Durbano 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
Attorneys for Durbano, Sachter & Mortensen 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAMSf LMTD., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID DURBANO, ETAL., 
Defendant. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
Case No. 053-87 
Date: 1-29-88 
Vicki Godfrey, Reporter 
S. Taylorr Court Clerk 
This is the time set for Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff was not present but was represented by William 
P. Schwartz, Esq. 
Defendant was not present but was represented by Doug 
Durbano, Esq. 
Issues and motion for judgment against the defendant 
presented to the Court by plaintiff1s counsel. 
Response by defendants counsel. 
Statement by the Court. 
Statement by plaintiff1s counsel. 
Statement by defendant's counsel. 
Statement by the Court. 
Statement by both counsel. 
If the matter is all one 1 transaction then the Court 
will grant judgment in favor of the plaintiff. If there is 
another trust deed putting the defendant's in 1st position, 
defendant's counsel to produce the deed for the Court, 
defendant's counsel to have 10 days to do so. If there is no 
deed, then plaintiff's counsel to prepare and submit the judgment 
for the Courts approval and signature. 
ADDENDUM F 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
and C.A. FERRIN, JR., 
Plaintiffs 
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER, 
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F. 
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H. 
CUNDICK, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. j/o53-87 
Plaintiffs', G. Adams Limited Partnership and C. A. Ferrin, Jr. ("Adams and 
Ferrin1') Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on 
January 29, 1988, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
in his courtroom at the Weber County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah. Adams and 
Ferrin were represented by William P. Schwartz, Esq. of Hansen & Anderson and 
Defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen were represented 
by Durbano, Smith <5c Reeve. Defendants Steven F. Cundick and Marlene Cundick 
did not contest Plaintiffs' Motion. Upon consideration of the Memoranda, 
Affidavits, Pleadings on File and the Arguments of Counsel, the Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Adams and Ferrin are entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is granted in 
favor of Plaintiffs and against all Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
Recorded Bookf-.^.'r. 
Page . . 
Indexed 
A. For the principal sum of $38,604.59 together with prejudgment 
interest of $15,774.93 from May 4, 1984 through January 29, 1988, in the total 
amount of $54,379.52, plus interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%) 
per annum ($16.42 per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid. 
B. For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in obtaining the 
Judgment as established by affidavit in the amount of $ ^ . /£ £/<-3« ^ , plus 
interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum ($ 
per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid. 
C. For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in collecting 
the Judgment. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this f $ day of-Jamnny, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
1988. 
ATTEST MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT this / 0 day of January, 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
( By . ^ ^//tt?^ 
DepulyClerk 
^Z£ 
Filed : ^ v^-irg^ 
